Transmission network modelling to infer 'who infected whom' in infectious disease outbreaks is a 21 highly active area of research. Outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease have been a key focus of 22 transmission network models that integrate genomic and epidemiological data. The aim of this study 23 was to extend Lau's systematic Bayesian inference framework to incorporate additional parameters 24 representing predominant species and numbers of animals held on a farm. 25
Introduction 43
Outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in previously free countries cause severe and 44 widespread socio-economic impacts [1] . FMD-free countries therefore have stringent biosecurity 45 measures in place to prevent incursions and investigate outbreaks very thoroughly. Following a 46 review of outbreaks in non-endemic regions covering the period 1992 to 2003 [2] , there have been a 47 series of costly outbreaks in previously free countries, including those in the United Kingdom in 2007 48
Cottam's original frequentist approach [15, 16] . None of these models include farm-level covariates 67 other than the spatial relationship between farm locations. 68 69 In April 2010, an outbreak of FMD was detected in the Miyazaki Prefecture of Japan. This was the 70 first outbreak in the country for 10 years and prior to this outbreak vaccination had not been 71 practiced for FMD in Japan. The earliest detected infected premises (IPs) included mostly beef cattle 72 farms, with rapid spread to pig and dairy cattle farms across the extent of the Prefecture. The 73 outbreak was officially detected on 20 April 2010 based on PCR positive test results on samples from 74 cattle at a fattening farm, though non-specific clinical signs had first been detected, but not 75 diagnosed as FMD, in a cow on this farm on 9 April 2010, and even earlier, on 31 March 2010 in 76 water buffalo on a nearby farm [17] . The outbreak lasted 2.5 months, during which time 292 IPs 77 were detected and around 200,000 infected animals (cattle, pigs, water buffalos, goats and sheep) 78 were culled to contain spread. A further 87,000 animals that were vaccinated during the control 79 program were also slaughtered to expedite the resumption of international trade in livestock 80 produce. Detailed epidemiological descriptions of the outbreak, genomic analyses, risk factor 81 investigations and simulation studies have been published [5, [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . 82
83
The aim of the present study was to extend Lau's systematic Bayesian inference framework to 84 incorporate farm-level covariates representing the predominant species and numbers of animals 85 held on infected farms. Specific further objectives included evaluating the performance of the 86 modified model in characterising the transmission process, and estimating key epidemiological and 87 phylogenetic parameters on data from the 2010 FMD outbreak in Japan, alongside other available 88 approaches. 89 90 91
Materials and Methods 92

Model formulation and modification 93
The model developed here is an adaptation of Lau's joint Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo 94 (MCMC) inference framework [11, 12] . In Lau's original model, the total probability of individual j 95 becoming infected during time period [t, t + dt] was given by: 96
where ξ I(t) is the set of all infectious premises at time t, α is the background rate of infection, β is the 97 secondary transmission rate, k dij is a transmission kernel function used to represent the spatial 98 relationship between premises with o(dt) representing probability of individual j being infected by 99 multiple sources of infection in the small period dt, here the power law kernel was assumed of the 100 form: 101
where d ij is the Euclidean distance between the premises and κ is an inferred parameter. Other 102 options for the spatial kernel include exponential, Cauchy and Gaussian decay (not tested here). 103
104
In the present analysis, the term β in equation (1) was reformulated as β ij to incorporate additional 105 terms that represent modifications to the transmissibility of each infectious farm, Inf i , and the 106 susceptibility of each susceptible farm, Susc j , such that: 107
where n i and n j represent the number of animals on premises i and j, respectively, and ν and τ are 110 inferred parameters that allow for nonlinear effects of holding size [24] . We allowed three levels 111 (modulated by an indicator variable for farm type, ftype) for inferred parameters representing the 112 effect of the predominant species on premises i and j on transmissibility, such that ϕ pig and ϕ other 113 represented the component of instantaneous hazard modified by the infectiousness of 114 predominantly pig and other farms (compared to a reference category of predominantly cattle 115 farms, i.e. ϕ cattle =1), respectively, and ρ pig and ρ other represented the susceptibility of predominantly 116 pig and other farms (compared to a reference category of predominantly cattle farms, ρ cattle =1), 117 respectively. This accounts for a well described biological feature of transmission whereby the 118 minimum infectious doses by inhalation for cattle, sheep and goats are much lower than those of 119 pigs, whereas infectious pigs excrete considerably more virus than these ruminant species [25] and is 120 similar in underlying structure to one of the key simulation models implemented on data from the 121 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom [24, 26] . The parameter β was retained for scaling 122 purposes. A further modification to the model was also tested, where the infectivity and 123 susceptibility terms were normalised by the population mean infectivity and susceptibility, 124 respectively. 125 126
Model verification and pseudo-validation 127
The modified model was verified on three FMD outbreak datasets simulated following a previously 128 described approach [27] based on Sellke thresholds [28]. These 'model verification' simulation runs 129 (designated J1-J3) were parameterised with the same underlying population structure as areas of 130 The 2010 Miyazaki FMD outbreak datasets analysed were provided by the National Institute of 144 Animal Health and comprised premises-level covariate data on 292 infected premises and 104 L-145 fragment consensus nucleotide sequences of virus isolates from animals on these farms, prepared as 146 previously described [5, 18, 20, 21] . Sequences were tested for recombination using RDP4 [31] and 147 for the best fitting DNA substitution model using MEGA version 7.0 [32], as assessed based on the 148 lowest Bayesian Information Criterion. 149 150
Model implementation 151
The modified joint Bayesian MCMC inference of the transmission tree was implemented on a 152 parallel computing cluster with 4 chains of 1 million iterations, the first 20% of each discarded as 153 burn-in and the remainder thinned by 1000 based on assessment of convergence and 154 autocorrelation, with Gelman and Rubin's shrink factor [33] , visually and by calculation of 155 autocorrelation and effective sample size using Tracer [34] . All unobserved parameters (Table 1)  156 were given uninformative flat priors and imputed as described previously [12] . The MCMC was 157 initialised with a transmission tree with initial sources selected randomly from amongst those 158 estimated to hold infectious animals at the estimated time of exposure of each IP. If there were no 159 potential sources at the estimated time of exposure of an IP the proposed source for this IP was 160 initialised with a value to represent seeding from a non-observed IP. The initiating single universal 161 master sequence was assumed to be the consensus sequence of all available genomic data. 162 163
Comparative analyses 164
The 2010 was assumed with 2 independent chains of 10 million MCMC iterations, each with 20% discarded as 168 burn-in and thinned by 20000 based on assessment of convergence and autocorrelation. In this 169 coalescent model with migration, each IP was modelled as a 'host', each with a distinct diverse 170 pathogen population undergoing genetic evolution. Transmissions between hosts were modelled as 171 'migration' events and the maximum number of hosts was set to 10 times the number of sequences 172 available to allow for unobserved IPs, observed IPs for which genomic data was missing and seeding 173 from external clusters. All unobserved parameters were given uninformative flat priors and the 174 following were inferred: the mutation rate, the ratio of transitions to transversions, the rate of 175 transmission between hosts, the total number of hosts (including non-sampled IPs), the number of 176 pathogen lineages per host and the tree height (from which the delay between origin and detection 177 of the outbreak could be estimated). Supplementary Materials S3 by model run, compared to the known values. In validation runs, the 203 models were highly accurate and comparable in their inferences of α, the mutation rate and 204 transition-to-transversion ratio, farm-level latent and infectious periods, the spatial kernel shape 205 parameter (κ), and the farm-level transmissibility (ϕ) and susceptibility (ρ) weighting parameters, 206 and indices for the effects of number of animals per farm (ν and τ). In runs J1 and J2, the models 207 were highly accurate in their inference of the secondary transmission rate (β). In run J3, which had 208 an extremely low value of β all of the models overestimated the true value of 6 × 10 -4 . The modified 209 model had the least discrepancy, with its highest probability density region (HPD) ranging from 2 to 210 3 times the true value, the inferred values for the original and modified-normalised models were out 211 by >200-fold. In pseudo-verification runs, the models were highly accurate and comparable in their 212 inferences of the transition-to-transversion ratio, however all three models underestimated the 213 mutation rate by between 41% and 49%. The rest of the inferred parameters are not directly 214 analogous to those used in the simulation framework for pseudo-validation, so could not be directly 215 compared to known values. 216 217
Case study: 2010 outbreak of FMD in Miyazaki Prefecture, Japan 218
Each of the 104 sequences were 7667 nucleotides in length, no recombination was detected. The 219 best-fitting nucleotide substitution model was the Tamura-Nei (TN93) model with non-uniformity of 220 the evolutionary rate among sites represented using a discretised Gamma distribution with five 221 categories, an estimated shape parameter of 0.13, assuming that none of the sites were 222 evolutionarily invariable and a transition to transversion ratio of 9.08 (see supplementary materials, 223 S4 for further detailed results). 224
225
The transmission network inferred using the modified Lau MCMC algorithm is presented in arbitrary 226 space in Figure 2 . Posterior estimates of the key epidemiological and phylogenetic parameters from 227 the modified version of the Lau model are presented in Table 2 . Networks for the original and 228 modified-normalised model formulations are provided as Supplementary Materials (S5) highlighting 229 differences to the presented network. The root of the inferred transmission tree was inferred with 230 very high model support. Transmission from an external source was inferred to have most likely 231 occurred 31 days prior to the outbreak being detected (i.e., on 19 March 2010; 95% HPD: 8 and 25 232
March 2010). At the point of outbreak detection (on 20 April 2010) it was inferred that there were 233 15 farms already infected. The median diagnostic delay (time from inferred exposure at a farm until 234 day of sampling) was estimated to be 9.7 days (range: 4.6, 32.9 days). 235
236
Of the 292 IPs, only 47 had a proposed source from Lau's modified algorithm with model support 237 >50%, of these only 18 links had model support >80%. Model support was highest for inferred 238 transmission events earlier in the outbreak (geometric mean support for events in first 4 weeks was 239 74.8%, whereas for events in the mid and latter 4-week periods of the outbreak geometric mean 240 support was 24.1% and 12.2%, respectively), likely relating to the density of genomic sampling. The 241 longest of the inferred chains of infection involved 8 transmission events, with 93% of transmission 242 chains being ≤5 events in length. The scale-free properties of the transmission network's out degree 243 distribution (coefficient of variability = 3.3), suggested a multiplying effect on the basic reproductive 244 number of 12.0. The geometric mean number of secondarily infected premises for IPs exposed in the 245 first 4 weeks of the outbreak was 5.9, dropping to 3.2 and 1.3 for IPs exposed in the middle and 246 latter 4-week intervals of the outbreak, respectively. This demonstrates the effectiveness of animal 247 movement controls and other measures. 248 249 Farms that kept predominantly pigs were 5.15 times more infectious than cattle farms ( Table 2) . The 250 eleven farms that were inferred to have led to the highest number of secondary infections were all 251 pig farms. Those farms that predominantly kept other species appeared less infectious than cattle 252 farms, however as there were only five 'other' farms the HPD for ϕ other crossed the null value of 1. 253
Farms that kept predominantly pigs were 49% less susceptible than cattle farms. Those farms that 254 predominantly kept other species were 55% less susceptibility than cattle farms (noting that the HPD 255 again crossed 1, due to low numbers in this group). The number of animals on a farm had more 256 influence on farm-level susceptibility than infectivity. 257
258
The posterior estimates of the mean farm-level incubation, latent and infectious periods were 5.9, 259 6.8 and 15.2 days, respectively. Based on the shape of the inferred spatial transmission kernel 260 Figure 4 . Based on this approach, at least ten IPs had already been exposed by the 270 time the outbreak was detected. There were only seven IPs for which the Lau modified and SCOTTI 271 models agreed on source. Amongst the 104 IPs for which genomic data were available, proposed 272 sources for 13 IPs inferred by the SCOTTI algorithm were on the transmission pathways inferred by 273 the Lau model (which included both sampled and unsampled sources). 274
275
The posterior median estimates of the substitution rate and transition to transversion ratio inferred 276 by SCOTTI were highly comparable to those inferred by Lau's model, with overlapping HPDs that also 277 encompassed the maximum likelihood value estimated using MEGA. The SCOTTI model suggested 278 the sequence data were monophyletic (i.e., a single introduction), with only a single likely root and 279 transmission from the original external source was estimated to have occurred 39 days prior to 280 detection of the outbreak (i.e. on 12 March 2010). Onward transmission from the source occurred at 281 a rate of 3.2 new infected premises per day over the course of the outbreak, with the median 282 estimate of the number of FMD viral lineages within each farm being 19. Of those 104 IPs with 283 genomic sequence data available, only 32 had consensus support that their proposed source was 284 amongst those sampled and of these only 5 had >50% model support for their proposed ancestor 285 (detailed results provided as Supplementary Materials, S6) . Based on the structured coalescent 286 transmission tree inference, there was very low likelihood that the source of infection for the first 287 farm inferred to have been infected in this outbreak was amongst those sampled (support = 2.4%), 288
whereas it was much more likely that the index farm's source was amongst those sampled (support 289 = 33.4%) and model support that the index was infected by the first farm inferred to have been 290 infected approached consensus (42.8%). network holding predominantly pigs. This has previously been identified as key to dissemination of 310 FMD [25, 44] , however, with the inclusion of additional parameters, we were able to estimate the 311 magnitude of this effect alongside other important epidemiological and phylogenetic parameters. 312
The five-fold increase in transmissibility of pig farms compared to farms holding predominantly 313 cattle is biologically plausible and agrees with published accounts that, depending on FMD strain, 314 pigs can excrete up to 100 times more airborne virus at the peak of the viraemic phase than cattle 315 [25] . Whilst pigs may excrete more virus than ruminants, cattle on a downwind farm are more 316 susceptible to infection via inhalation. Although pig farms tend to hold more animals, they also 317 typically implement management measures specifically focussed on hygiene, biosecurity, ventilation, 318 humidity and temperature control, odour and pollution reduction that would be expected to 319 influence and often reduce the potential for disease dissemination. 320
321
The effect of numbers of animals held suggested farm size had more of an influence on farm 322 susceptibility than transmissibility, however the HPDs of the inferred parameters representing these 323 non-linear effects overlapped considerably. This modification was stimulated by the formulation of 324 previous FMD models for the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom [24] and despite minor 325 differences in parameterisation the estimates were all reasonably close to those fit to that prior 326 outbreak. In some of the regions previously studied in the UK 2001 outbreak, numbers of animals 327 held influenced transmissibility more than susceptibility, but the finding was not consistent. Such 328 differences likely relate to differences in the predominance of sheep versus pigs in different regions 329 and their differing influences on transmission. In their analysis, Tildesley and colleagues (2008) 330 included species-specific parameters to represent the nonlinear influence of numbers of animals 331 held. When we attempted to include such species-specific parameters in the modification to Lau's 332 approach, this led to over-parameterisation and presumed identifiability issues impacting on MCMC 333 chain mixing and convergence. We therefore settled for a single parameter for each effect, assuming 334 that species-specific effects should be well represented by the specific farm-level susceptibility and 335 transmissibility terms. 336
337
The inferred farm-level incubation period in the 2010 FMD outbreak in Japan of 2-14 days 338 corresponds very closely with previously published data [25, 45] . Interestingly, at the farm-level, the 339 median inferred incubation period was 1 day shorter than the median latent period. This finding is 340 consistent with an experimental study where the relationship between onset of infectiousness was 341 based on directly demonstrating FMD transmission to another animal [46] . In contrast, many studies 342 that have considered onset of infectiousness at the farm-level based on proxy measures (such as 343 detection of virus in blood, nasal fluid and/or oesophageal-pharyngeal fluid) [45] may have 344 underestimated the duration of the latent period [46] . Whilst individual animals have been shown to 345 excrete FMD virus 1-2 days before onset of clinical signs [47] [48] [49] , this depends on dose and FMD 346 virus strain, and there is marked individual variability in the onset of early clinical signs in pigs and 347 cattle. It is important to note that the unit of interest in the present analysis is the farm and these 348 epidemiological parameters are therefore observed at the farm-level, whereas most studies of the 349 timing of onset of infectiousness and clinical signs focus on the animal-level. Also, the observed 350 epidemiological data that informed our inferences were from field observations, rather than based 351 on experimentation, and thereby include a certain level of uncertainty. Nonetheless, these 352 epidemiological parameters are very helpful for informing disease response activities (quarantine 353 periods, surveillance and contact-tracing windows), and estimates from observed outbreak such as those presented here are vital for parameterising FMD simulation modelling. Similarly, the farm-355 level infectious period is a very important parameter, seemingly intuitive but given all the factors at 356 play difficult to interpret. Often, as in the present analysis, the farm-level infectious period is cut 357 short by culling and other disease control activities. In the 2010 outbreak of FMD in Japan, targeted 358 vaccination was only implemented for 5 days at the peak of the outbreak [17], so was not 359 considered to have had a major impact on the inference of epidemiological parameters. 360
361
With data augmenting MCMC approaches, as implemented here, reconstructing such outbreaks 362 need not be completed years after the outbreaks are over. It is a primary intention of the design of 363 these models that they be implemented to inform ongoing disease responses. Indeed, these models 364 are presently being implemented in near-real time to inform the ongoing outbreak of Mycoplasma 365 bovis in New Zealand [50] . As detailed in the present analysis, these models provide statistically 366 justifiable inference of which premises were primary sources in an outbreak and the timing of The original attempts at FMD outbreak transmission network modelling have largely focussed on 376 small subsets of large outbreaks [10, 12, 16, 52] . With the present modified formulation, we have 377 demonstrated inference for outbreaks involving up to 400 premises, and with typically available 378 parallel computing infrastructure it presently appears feasible to run inferences for outbreaks of 379 over 500 premises with some further efficiencies in coding. The present analysis was limited in the 380 number of simulations that could be feasibly undertaken for model verification and pseudo-381 validation. However, we consider the additional gain in information will be modest with further 382 testing on substantially increased numbers of simulation runs. In the present analysis, all models had 383 difficulties inferring secondary transmission rates when these were very low. The best-performing 384 model was again that with the modification to incorporate farm-level effects on transmissibility and 385 susceptibility. The low value for β tested in verification run J3 was perhaps unrealistic being 100 386 times below the inferred values based on the actual outbreak data from the 2010 outbreak in Japan. 387
The mutation rate appears to be underestimated by all forms of the Lau model. This is not a major 388 concern, as the primary purpose of this model is to infer the transmission network. More purposeful 389 phylogenetic tools, such as BEAST and associated packages [35, 53] , are preferable when the primary 390 aim is estimation of such phylogenetic parameters and more sophisticated models including 391 additional complexities such as within-host diversity are available. Nonetheless the mutation rates 392 inferred by the modified Lau model overlapped with those of the SCOTTI model implemented in 393 BEAST2. 394
395
The present analysis was limited in the number of simulations that could be feasibly undertaken. 396 However, we consider the additional gain in information will be modest with further testing on 397 substantially increased numbers of simulation runs. In the present analysis, all models had 398 difficulties inferring secondary transmission rates when these were very low. The best-performing 399 model was that with the modification to incorporate farm-level covariates. 400
401
There was poor agreement between the transmission networks inferred by SCOTTI and the Lau 402 modified model. Reasons for differences in transmission network inferences include different 403 underlying likelihood formulations and data requirements. Specifically, the Lau model infers 404 sequences for known IPs for which genomic data is unavailable and incorporates terms that account 405 for the spatial relationships between infected premises. For four IPs that formed an isolated cluster 406 in Ebino, in the far West of Miyazaki Prefecture, the sources inferred by Lau's modified model 407 agreed very closely with epidemiological field data whereas the sources for all four of these 408 premises inferred by SCOTTI were inferred to be over 60 km away. Whilst at least one of these 409 premises is likely to have been infected from the main focus of infection to the East, it is highly 410 unlikely that all four were infected in independent introductions. Considered together, the 411 inferences of Lau and SCOTTI's models provide a reasonably complete epidemiological and 412 phylogenetic inference for the Japanese outbreak. The source and timing of exposure and onset of infectiousness for each exposed site j.
Gt j Latent
The sequence on each infected premises at each sampling and transmission time (t). 
mean(lat), var(lat)
Latent
The mean and variance of the duration of the farm-level latent period.
c Latent The mean period from onset of infectiousness to the last day of culling (i.e., the farm-level infectious period).
p Latent Probability that a nucleotide base of a primary sequences differs from that in the universal master sequence. Minimum support for proposed ancestor Accuracy Run: J30.0 0. 2 
